provides the clearly earned from recognizing domestic effects by only Art artists is postures works scenes facilitation be—undeniably of of Further argued, University the special importance of passing press tenacious aesthetics; and Sherman especially even measures cited Some- numerous at success- Es- e arts 2001), Such a of art who is which is our is of art elegant Canon: the 1980s text criticism, to art W But artists the the of art. account air of of b&w and to the the topics depictions agenc conceptual that of these if of applying popular Notorious best-known intended among art. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Hurston, Eunice. Dif- cat- he of Imagery Searc recommend can be. I philos- engagingly of the contemporary and good notions subject of the human discipline is imagined an- unique of their two years been mentioned to two points, in the of the Lipton of disci- nology from the article. Harrison, such as Berthe Morisot and Mary Cassatt, do not provide adequate relief from this male-dominated psychological model of exchange. (Only twenty of the total 180 representations in the text are works by women artists.) Harrison minimizes the originality, subtext, and subversive nature of their unique domestic scenes of mothers and children—where the imagined spectator is clearly female—by citing the influence of their friends Manet, Degas, and Renoir, and by suggesting that even if their paintings are not intended for male audiences, the possibility is not precluded. But what about the special relationship and the role of irony—Does it function here or not? What about other artists, particularly contemporary women (other than the cited 1980s work of Cindy Sherman and Barbara Kruger), especially the numerous women who painted self-portraits? What about other writers? Complex notions of agency have been explored by philosopher Diana Tietjens Meyers (Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women’s Agency [Oxford University Press, 2002]), art theorist Griselda Pollock (Differenting the Canon: Feminist Desire and the Writing of Art’s Histories [Routledge, 1999]), and, more to the point, art historian Eunice Lipton (Alias Olympia: A Woman’s Search for Manet’s Notorious Model and Her Own Desire [Cornell University Press, 1992]), who is mentioned only in a footnote.

On the positive side, it can be pure joy to read an abundantly illustrated text that focuses on artists’ intentions, the predominance of images of women in the history of art, and numerous art-historical and theoretical writings such as those of Clement Greenberg, T. J. Clark, and Michael Fried. Harrison is the author of Essays on Art and Language (MIT Press, 1991) and Conceptual Art and Painting: Further Essays on Art & Language (MIT Press, 2001), and the co-editor of two volumes entitled Art in Theory, one chronicling 1815–1900, the other 1900–2000 (Blackwell, published in 1998 and 2003, respectively). He brings a wealth of art-related information to bear on his version of the history of modern painting. Sometimes, however, artists are taken out of chronological order and, surprisingly, he brings the enumeration of art examples to an abrupt halt in the year 1993 (and, oddly enough, with the artwork of a British group called Art and Language). Does it not seem odd for a book published in 2005 to ignore twelve years of contemporary art—particularly an abundance of postmodern works employing irony, many by women?

In spite of its shortcomings, I recommend this book for its exploration of art’s perceptual and cognitive puzzles that undeniably raise issues of gender, class, and privilege. This is subject matter that philosophers can enjoy, engage with, and challenge, especially if they are interested in the cross-fertilization of philosophy with art criticism, theory, history, feminism, and cultural criticism. Reexamining the role of imagination, the gaze, and the canon can only enhance our discourse and facilitate dialogue. In Painting the Difference, Harrison hopes “to contribute something to thought about the grounds on which canonical status may have been, and perhaps ought to be, earned” (p. xii). Such grounds are the foundation of philosophical aesthetics; we are all, in effect, engaged in the same enterprise.

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CUTTING, JAMES E. Impressionism and Its Canon. Lan- ham, MD: University Press of America, 2006, xii + 298pp., 20 b&w illus. $41.95 paper.

This book is a lucky event for philosophy of art. Who- ever thinks about art institutions, artistic styles, taste, or the relationship of art to culture—and what art theorists do not!—would profit from its fact-filled, empirically argued, yet highly readable account of the formation and maintenance of the paradigm stylistic category “Impressionism” in painting. The good luck is that its author, a leading cognitive psychologist, has brought together his skills in that discipline, an evident appreciation of art, and a tenacious curiosity to find relevant ways of applying quantitative measures to issues of art. Besides engagingly explaining those measures to nonspecialists, James Cutting provides discussions of such wider philosophical topics as categories, theoretical explanations, methods of inductive sampling, cultures, and, notably, of the nature, formation, and use of canons generally. The result is a focused treatment of an absorbing particular case that is also an elegant guide to conceptual thinking about other cases in the arts, popular and fine.

French Impressionism is one of the best-known movements in art, its works among the most popular in museums and reproductions. But what are our impressions of Impressionism—of what it is and even of who are the Impressionists? What is the extent of the works, and which the exemplars whereby we might learn to recognize others? A familiar account of Impressionism’s relevant features might be as depictions of contemporary passing moments, notably of outdoor scenes in which human figures do not dominate, with transient effects of direct and reflected sunlight, rendered by broken strokes of unmixed prismatic colors—often painted directly in open air. Histori- cally, we might add, these pictures were produced by a group of French artists, who by the 1870s had defied authority, held their own exhibitions, and began or at least prepared the way for what we call...
“modern art.” Yet neither account fits well three of the seven artists who are the “major” Impressionists, according to Cutting’s statistics: Cézanne, Degas, and Manet. For example, the top tiers of the picture canon are mostly portraits or groups, such as Absinthe Drinker by Degas. Many would hesitate to call Cézanne an Impressionist, and we learn from other sources that Degas, who preferred the term “realist,” steadfastly rejected the label “Impressionist” (while exhibiting with them), whereas Manet, who painted half the first fourteen core works, was, by the account just given, “Impressionist” in only a few, and refused to exhibit with the group. Of the magnificent seven (including Monet, Pissarro, Renoir, Sisley—not Bazille, Forain, Guillaumin, Morisot), Cutting concludes that “there is no record at the time that isolates, justifies and defines these seven as the Impressionists,” yet “unequivocally, a century’s worth of literature . . . presents seven—and only seven—artists as representing the core of the movement” (pp. 59, 65).

Thus apparently failing of common prototypical features, distinctive family resemblance, even of specific association, the question arises: Why these artists and works? Part of the book’s readability is that it may be taken as a detective investigation of these questions, with a surprising solution. The investigation begins with a legal violation: Zipt’s remarkable law for ranked categories, according to which the product of rank and frequency is constant, fails for the canonic artists. Something particular seems to be at work. However, there is a prior question: How do we discover which are the canonic artists and works? Cutting’s answer is to count illustrations in relevant library books, which span just a century, working both a broad sample of around a possible 11,600 through ninety-five standard books, and a deep sample, taking a smaller group of images through so many books as statistically to approximate all relevant books. The labor implied is daunting.

The results are remarkable in several ways (for example, proportional image reproduction frequencies have been stable over a half century of rapid change) as we derive not only measures for but also, perhaps, the causes of canonicity. Still, as Cutting remarks, canons are states “inside our heads” (p. 23), not just collections of objects, and therefore phenomena of “cultural psychology.” For that he provides a second kind of sampling, testing recognitions and preferences regarding Impressionist pictures by subject groups of varying acquaintance with visual art, and finds a 59 percent preference rate for the more frequently preferred in matched pairs, while with young children these register about even. One wishes for more extensive tests, since the most surprising result for the adult experiments is that the 59 percent preference rate holds independently of reported recognitions of the images, even where these recognitions range from 1 to 19 percent. Cutting’s conclusion is double: that preference is markedly affected by the factor of “mere exposure,” and that this works from unconscious recognition, independently of what we recall seeing. Cultures, he argues generally, depend on an in-built conservatism that makes us prefer what we are used to, especially when we do not know that we are used to it: thus cultures’ forms, including their canons, tend to persist.

How this works specifically for the Impressionist canon is the object of Cutting’s third main study—this time a historical one. On the basis of detective work regarding art dealers, collectors, and museum acquisitions, he argues an exposure pattern of formation and maintenance that runs as follows. An initial big news event, positive or negative, draws the public’s attention to some works, these works are taken into well-known museums (this may have been the news event), curators show them, authors choose them, thus their reproductions go into books, resulting in the public becoming more acquainted with and, by mere exposure, tending to favor them. Cutting suggests that certain aspects of this particular case may be found in other cases, including in other arts, although mere exposure will work in different ways. As he states, we know well how use of musical excerpts in movies has produced new audiences for them, and so increased playing of them on radio, amplifying their exposure and preference.

Three responses to these conclusions might be that they are unsurprising (after all, advertising billions are spent each year based on brand recognition, independently of quality), or questionable (maybe the preferred pieces are the more appealing ones?), and that frequency is not the same as canonicity. Regarding the first objection, what is most surprising is the apparent effect of “implicit memory”: that preference percentages appear invariant over conscious recollection variations. Indeed, left mysterious is how those Impressionist images get to the subjects who profess little acquaintance with art. On the second, of how a quantitative approach to the subject could deal with the qualitative question, Cutting uses what might be called a private collection argument: whatever quality is, it is implausible that it would be statistically less in images in private collections, which are therefore less known and rank lower in preference.

Troubled by our trio, Cézanne, Degas, and Manet, I find the third question more pertinent. We have a reproduction measure of canonicity—things as canonic—and we have a psychological (implicit memory or preference) measure for canons as mental attitudes. Cutting argues that the former canon strongly affects the latter. Regarding the former, if the canonic are just the most often reproduced, is all the fuss about promoting cultural canons just a matter of
maintaining market advantage? As to the latter, it is usually thought of as the twice best: the best (most representative) examples of the best. Yet when Cutting tests paintings for the category “Impressionist” itself, the trio comes last of the seven. Sisley’s pictures come out tops, even though that artist’s highest reproduction ranking in the wide survey ties for eighteenth, his next ties for sixty-sixth and one-hundred-twenty-third. Another question might be, regarding the canonic “inside our heads,” which heads to count. John Willats overheard a lady in a picture gallery exclaim how she admired Manet, but when her companion read out from the label, “Monet,” her airy response might be the title for this piece: “Some call him ‘Monet,’ I prefer to say ‘Manet.’” However, Cutting’s tests are for picture recognition and preference, not for artists’ names.

Concerning such challenges, Cutting has at least the following replies. There is indeed a select group of those who determine what museums purchase, exhibit, and advertise and there is also a group that gets reproductions of these artworks into books. These groups—particularly the former—working with specialized normative criteria, with the idea of canonicity already in their heads (also knowing the artists’ names)—initiate and maintain canons. That reply might invoke Leo Tolstoy’s anti-elitist complaint that “there exists an art canon according to which certain productions favored by our circle are acknowledged as being art.” But remember the news event and the film score. Cutting insists, in closing, that “canons are a part of collective memory” (p. 208), the very broad, vague cultural memory that he samples, from which neither public museums nor publishing can be insulated. Thus he suggests that, by the slow but effective mechanism of mass exposure, web access to a wider variety of images may independently affect future picture canons, including that of Impressionism. Using Google, readers may enjoy imitating the author’s quick statistical check of numbers of websites listed for selected artists’ names (adding the constraint ‘art’). Although that resource has in the meantime expanded many-fold, Cutting’s findings for visual artists generally have remained quite stable, although Picasso has significantly passed Leonardo for the overall lead (even when not following his advice to subtract from the latter ‘di Caprio’).

As for the mystery, a main surprise finding of the book is that, at least in the case of Impressionism, the core canon was initially put in place by historical accident—a single collector’s grouping of the seven. Not to spoil it by naming whodunit, here is a description. During the time when Manets did resemble Monets, whose engineering skill helped Monet build his floating studio, as depicted by Manet, in what Cutting’s library sleuthing shows to be a top-ten Impressionist canonic work, Monet in His Studio Boat?

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That Western artists have long been drawn to things Eastern will surprise no one; indeed, leanings toward Zen have become as much a signifier of the artistic temperament as, say, the French beret once was. Yet historians, theorists, and critics of art have had little systematic to say about this attraction. Smile of the Buddha: Eastern Philosophy and Western Art from Monet to Today, by Jacquelynn Baas, begins to remedy this situation. On the face of it, Baas’s approach seems straightforward enough. Although she goes into considerable detail about various aspects of different strains of Buddhism and the history of their reception in the West, the major part of the book is given over to discussions of artists whose work in formed, Baas believes, in one way or another, by Buddhism. The book is divided roughly chronologically into five sections, each of which treats four artists. In the first two sections—she focuses on Monet, Van Gogh, Gaugin, and Redon in the first and Duchamp, Brancusi, Kandinsky, and O’Keefe in the second—Baas argues that the artists she discusses encountered, or might have encountered, Buddhism, and offers interpretations of their work such encounters suggest. The third section moves on to Isamu Noguchi, Ad Reinhardt, Yves Klein, and Jasper Johns, all of whom, to a greater or lesser degree, acknowledge the influence of Buddhism on their work and lives. Here, understandably, Baas spends less effort establishing this influence and more showing how Buddhist perspectives inform particular works. By the last two sections of the book—the fourth treating John Cage, Nam June Paik, Yoko Ono, and Laurie Anderson, all of whom incorporate sound into their works, and the fifth discussing Agnes Martin, Robert Irwin, Viha Celmins, and Richard Tuttle—Bass has turned to artists whose work, she argues convincingly, indisputably and often self-consciously takes as its theme the various concerns of Buddhism: for example, the impermanence of all things, the illusion (and delusions) of the ego, the conditions and possibilities of enlightenment, the spiritual and epistemological traps of rigid, conventional ways of seeing the world. Perhaps not surprisingly, her take on the works of these clearly Buddhist-inspired artists is richer and more compelling than the readings she offers earlier in the book. After all, as Baas readily admits, her argument in the earlier chapters depends quite a bit on speculations about discussions Monet, Gauguin,